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When I was in graduate school at McGill University in Montréal, Canada, not so very long ago, the
Faculty of Religious Studies taught two large undergraduate introductory religion courses: Western
and Eastern religions. Though this dichotomous
representation of the “World’s Religions” had been
commonplace for over a century, I was surprised
to discover that while the Western course included
the usual suspects, Christianity and Judaism, their
monotheistic (or “Abrahamic”) younger sibling Islam was lumped with Hinduism, Buddhism, and
Confucianism as “Eastern.” It seems that I was not
the only one who found this odd, since within several years a shift was made, such that Islam found
itself (happily or not!) back in the arms of the West.
Of course, given the presence of Islam in the Indian
subcontinent and southeast Asia, one could make
the argument that it belongs to the East as much to
the West. But then, the same case could be made for
Christianity, which, though less present in Asia, has
“conquered” huge swathes of Africa, even while declining in much of “Christian” Europe.
All this to say, the traditional and persistent grouping of religions into “Western” and “Eastern” is, to
my mind, a hugely problematic legacy of colonial
days—one that creates more problems than it solves.
At the same time, the very fact that such categories
exist and have become so deeply engrained within
scholarship on religion is itself, as they say, a “teachable moment.” Thus, rather than deny or avoid these
categories, my approach has been to begin with these
divisions and work with students to see what sense
we can make of them. In this essay I reflect on the
meaning and (ab)use of categories such as “Eastern”
and “Western”—or “Asian” and “Japanese” for that
matter—in my teaching and scholarship.

Never the ‘Twain Shall Meet...
It is certainly true that Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam have deep, shared roots, and can be fruitfully taught together, albeit at great sacrifice to the
depth and diversity—perhaps especially the cultural
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complexity—of these three traditions. Any course
in “JCI” must at very least emphasize the various
“West Asian” cultural constructs that gave birth to
all three traditions (in addition to the obvious Hellenistic or “Western” influences on all three; e.g.,
Neoplatonism on Judaic mysticism, Plato on Augustine, Aristotle on Ibn Rushd). In short, it is imperative that, beyond the deep familial connections of the
Abrahamic faiths, both their intramural diversity and
ineluctably hybrid aspects deserve to be highlighted
today, more than ever, if we want our students (and
ourselves) to get over the tendency to simplify and
reduce the traditions to limited signifiers—whether
these are “positive” or “negative.” To some extent,
this requires setting up categories in order to break
them down, to the extent that virtually all expectations of definitional solidity are threatened. To crib
from Marx, all that is solid must and should melt
into air.
The so-called “Eastern” religions present a more
complicated scenario, since the major living religions
of Asia stem from at least two very different civilizational blocks: India and China (which are themselves,
of course, extremely diverse). The problem with the
concept of the “East”—or, for that matter, “Asia”—
is its extraordinary ethnic, linguistic, geographical,
political, and religious diversity, which is partly due
to the fact that, in terms of sheer size, Asia outweighs
Europe geographically by a factor of 4 and population-wise by a factor of 6. Having said that, as with
the Abrahamic traditions, there are shared roots between the major Indian traditions—Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, and Sikhism—and also between
those that emerged from Sinitic cultures: Daoism
and Confucianism (and arguably Japanese Shinto).
When teaching a course (in Japan) on “Western Religions,” I would divide Asia into two blocks and deal
with each tradition in relation to that larger civilizational and geographic frame, using Buddhism as a
bridge between them. Thus Buddhism became my
“skilful means” for bringing my Japanese students
towards “enlightenment” (another problematic term
that I will leave aside here). While this was generally
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successful, I struggled to integrate, for example, the
Sikh tradition, given its manifest roots in Islam, and
largely ignored the impact of Christianity in Asia,
because my Japanese students simply lacked the
requisite background in this history of Christianity
in the West. Given that Islam has deeper historical
and cultural roots in Asia than Christianity, it seems
to me that any introductory course on “World Religions” might usefully employ Islamic traditions as a
“bridge” between—or perhaps better, as a battering
ram to shatter—facile conceptions of East and West.
Of course, even with Asia sub-divided into these
three “sources”—west, south and southeast, and
East Asia—the entire continent of Africa is left out
(at least the indigenous traditions), as are North and
South America. What we are left with then, in the
end, is an Asia-centrism (or Silk-Road-centrism) to
replace Euro-centrism. As long as we focus on the
larger, institutionalized and often text-based traditions such as those listed above, this may be inevitable.
As a European-Canadian Asianist, teaching in a
comparative humanities program at a large liberal
arts college in the United States, I have many opportunities to explore and explode some of these
categorical frameworks. One course I regularly
teach at Bucknell entitled “Beat Zen, Square Zen:
Buddhism in American Culture” provides an excellent venue for discussion of the ways that one
prototypical “Eastern” religion—Buddhism—has
been variously described, defamed, romanticized,
and caricatured through Eurocentric and Orientalist
lenses for a century and a half. Yet, in this course I
also took pains to stress that the concept of Orientalism is in fact quite complex and is a sword that cuts
both ways. Japanese Buddhist “reformers” in the
Meiji period, for instance, effectively constructed a
“modern” Buddhism that they felt, with some justification, could easily win over liberal, Protestant,
or agnostic Westerners searching for something both
“rational” and “spiritual.” Furthermore, the discourse adopted by Japanese Buddhist modernists
occasionally borrowed from both Enlightenment
and Marxist critiques of Western religions as superstitious “opiates”—using the West against the West,
as it were. James Ketelaar has usefully referred to
this as “strategic Occidentalism,” but it just as well
could be called “strategic Orientalism,” since it is as
much about reframing the meaning of Asia as the
West. What makes this story particularly interesting
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is that it subverts the standard (Saidian) critique of
“Orientalism” as being a Western colonialist imposition that demeans and/or exoticizes the Eastern
“other.” As a result of these discussions, students are
profoundly “disoriented”—which is exactly what I
aim for in all my teaching.

Modernity and its Others
Beyond their effects in classroom pedagogy, categories of “East” and “West” play a significant role
in my research, which examines the various ways
by which (largely modern and liberal-progressive)
“Western” ideas have been adopted, adapted, and
utilized by Japanese Buddhists since the Meiji period (1868–1912). The “Meiji Restoration” of 1868
opened the floodgates to Western ideas and ideals,
especially those emerging from late-nineteenth century Russia, Germany, France, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Tolstoy, Longfellow, Rousseau, Thomas Carlyle, and Herbert Spencer made a
particular impression on the increasingly educated
Japanese public, as did, to a somewhat more limited
extent, the work of Marx, Bakunin, Kant, Hegel and
Nietzsche (in addition, a few writers and thinkers
who can charitably be called “obscure” in the West
made a surprising splash in Japanese intellectual
waters—just as would happen with relatively obscure Western musicians in the 1970s and ‘80s). It
was astonishing to me to realize how quickly these
and other Western writers were absorbed (albeit not
always with circumspection or in good translation)
into not only the Meiji educational curriculum but
also the very cultural expectations of what it meant
to be “modern.”
In other words, for many if not most young Japanese of the period, modernity was both a disruptive,
vertigo-inducing condition and a promising ideal for
Japan—the latter understood in terms of individual
as well as national destiny. More significantly, although undeniably sparked by the “West,” there
was a general understanding that modernity could
and must be transplanted onto Japanese soil. In fact,
not a few of these idealistic, newly educated, mostly
male youth were convinced that modernity would
even find more fertile soil in Japan than in the West!
How could this be so? One reason was Christianity.
While there were certainly many in Japan who associated Christianity with the West, and thus with
civilization, education, and progress, there were
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equally many who were very well aware of the attacks that both the Christian institutions and even
doctrines had been undergoing since the Reformation and particularly the eighteenth-century French
Enlightenment (whose leading figures were, not coincidentally, generally sympathetic to Asian thought
traditions). In short, Japan in particular and East
Asia in general did not need to get over Christianity
in order to become modern. They were, in a sense,
already attuned to thinking of the world in “modernistic” terms—by which was generally inferred a
pragmatic, realistic, and “this worldly” (if not quite
“materialistic”) sense.
Where Japanese modernists did lean towards
Christianity, it was more often the liberal, heterodox
versions of such, including Unitarianism—which
was also making gains in the United States, particularly among the educated classes (“Brahmins”) of
the northeast. Among progressive young Buddhists,
the Unitarian movement in Japan was especially inspirational, as was the emerging Christian socialist
movement (in fact, most of the leading early socialists in Japan were Christians). While lay Buddhist
preacher Ōuchi Seiran (1845–1918), who lectured at
the Unitarian School of Advanced Learning, refused
to accept the monotheistic inclinations of Unitarianism, other prominent Buddhist progressives such as
Nakanishi Ushiro (1859–1930), Hirai Kinza (1859–
1916) and some of the later New Buddhists believed
they had found in Unitarian ideas a fundamental
similarity—if not complete unity—with Buddhist
thought. Of course, this was always an uneasy alliance, since Buddhist reformers of a Unitarian bent
such as Nakanishi and Hirai were inclined to interpret Unitarian teachings on Buddhist terms, whereas
those coming to this relationship from the Unitarian
side would do precisely the opposite. Prior to their
eventual and perhaps inevitable falling out, however, progressive Buddhists made good use of Unitarian principles to give structure to their own ideals for
modern, humanistic Buddhism, ideas which would
be imported back to the West via figures like D. T.
Suzuki (1870–1966), who in his youth was very much
a part of the New Buddhist movement and whose
primary teacher, Shaku Sōen (1859–1919), was at the
forefront of Meiji Buddhist attempts at “strategic occidentalism”; i.e., reimagining and repackaging Buddhist ideas to appeal to Western tastes.
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The Case of Hirai Kinza
In order to flesh out the complex nature, problems
and possibilities of the manifest hybridity exhibited
in the work of Japanese Buddhist modernists, I will
here examine the case of Hirai Kinza (1859–1916).
While considerably less well known than Shaku
Sōen or D. T. Suzuki, Hirai’s work represents, in my
estimation, the most sophisticated attempt to bridge
the “East-West” divide via a transmutation of religion (Buddhism and Unitarianism) and politics (socialism).1 As a young man Hirai held various jobs,
including a short stint as translator for the Japanese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but it was while learning
English in Nagasaki that he became an anti-Christian
activist, based largely on the condescension towards
Japanese people and culture he experienced among
Westerners. Around the same time, he took lay Buddhist initiation and studied at Kenninji, a historic
Rinzai Zen temple in Higashiyama, Kyoto. In 1885
Hirai founded the Oriental Hall, a Buddhist private
school of English meant to compete with the various
Christian missionary schools of the day, including
the Dōshisha English School (today’s Dōshisha University) established by Nijima Jō (1843–1890) in 1875.
It was at this time that Hirai first encountered the
Theosophical Society of Madame Helena Blavatsky
(1831–1891) and Colonel Henry Steel Olcott (1832–
1907). Over the next few years, Hirai’s involvement
with the Theosophists would increase.
In 1893, Hirai travelled with the small Japanese delegation to attend the World’s Parliament of Religions
in Chicago. One of two lay-Buddhist delegates along
with Noguchi Zenshiro, Hirai was more eclectic in
his presentation of Buddhism than his colleagues—
and this is due in part to his prior contact with Colonel Olcott and the Theosophical movement, as well
as the simple fact that, as an educated lay Buddhist,
he was less constrained than his priestly companions
by sectarian and larger Buddhist doctrinal limitations. He was also, as has been well-documented, by
far and away the most accomplished English-speaker among the Japanese delegates, which goes some
way towards explaining his impact on audiences,
which was arguably greater than any other Buddhist
representative save, perhaps, the charismatic Sinhalese Buddhist (and Olcott disciple) Anagarika Dharmapala (1864–1933).
Hirai’s paper, “The Real Position of Japan Towards
Christianity,” caused something of a sensation in
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Chicago. It was a passionate, eloquent, and wellargued critique of Western economic and political
imperialism and colonialism, couched in moralistic
terms that highlighted in particular the hypocrisy of
a Western Christianity that, while supporting these
forms of blatant oppression and exploitation, continued to dismiss the Japanese and others as “heathens.”2 Boldly accepting the title of “heathen” in an
echo of what a later generation of Marxists might
call “the epistemological privilege of the oppressed,”
Hirai was generally lauded in the American press
for “out-Christianizing” the Christians. While Hirai’s strategy of strategic Occidentalism is one that
was widely employed by other Buddhist modernists and reformers, including Shaku Sōen and other
speakers at the Parliament, only Hirai used this to
develop the foundations for a Buddhist or religious
criticism.
His use of a real politik presentation of current
relations stripped away the thin veneer of “brotherhood” that had been evoked by almost every
Parliamentarian and had been used to cover the
severe fissures that riddled the Parliament’s cosmopolitan project. Hirai laid the groundwork for
genuine cultural interaction based upon a healthy
respect for real difference. (Ketelaar 1990, 170)

In short, Hirai was able to critique Western, Christian (and implicitly, Japanese) appeals to universalism, particularly when these appeals rested on unequal power distribution between nations—and,
one might add, between individuals. Read in this
light, Hirai opened up a way of thinking that in the
twentieth-century became known as Critical Theory (associated primarily with Marxist thought, but
also with existentialism, feminism, and postcolonial
perspectives). As Yoshinaga Shin’ichi puts it, “[Hirai’s] Chicago address was a radical and beautiful
melody, blending pantheism, Mahayana Buddhism,
modernism and Zen” (Yoshinaga 2007, 8).
I would like to move beyond Hirai’s celebrated
Parliament speech, however, to further investigate
this idea of religious or Buddhist critique. In a work
entitled Shūkyō to seiji (Religion and politics), published in 1898, Hirai expands his critique of the
West to Japan itself, noting the disconnect between
the mid-Meiji discourse of freedom and rights and
the fact that Japan remained a de facto oligarchy, in
which a greater portion of the population lived in
poverty and oppression—while sustaining the ex6 BULLETIN FOR THE STUDY OF RELIGION

ploitative system for those on top. Rather than take
this argument in the direction it seems to be heading, however, and dismiss religion as an “opiate”
that helps perpetuate injustice, Hirai lauds religion,
broadly conceived, as a potential savior for society.
Only religion, he argues, has the breadth and power
to combat the institutional structures of politics, law,
and economy. Hirai adds an important element here:
religion itself must remain open to (self-)critique, on
the basis of its employment and adoption of forms of
power: “A religious practice that refuses to be either
belief in politics or the politics of belief can for the
first time allow, perhaps, for the possibility of critical compassion” (Ketelaar 1990, 171). Thus, while,
as for most of the Buddhist modernists, religion and
politics must to some degree intermingle, for Hirai
this does not mean that religion need be a tool of the
state; rather, religion is always already implicated in
politics, since it effects our fundamental values and
orientation towards the world of others. Religion, in
short “is an integral element of the social order and
as such must serve as both a moral and an ethical
guide, as well as a tool for expanded social production and the distribution of wealth” (171).
Elsewhere, in an article entitled “Jinrui shinporon” (On the progress of humanity), published in
the Unitarian journal Rikugō zasshi in August 1900,
Hirai argues that human intellectual progress must
include progress in virtue (dōtokushin) and moral
sense (dōgishin), rather than simply scholarship (gakumon) and science (kagaku)—and yet, he argues
these former two have progressed little if at all since
ancient times (Hirai 1900). Ultimately, virtue and
intelligence must be brought together, though this
may require a complete overhaul in the way society
presently works. Hirai argues that education and religion, two spheres that should help in this regard,
have largely failed to bring about this reconciliation, which is why we must now look to large-scale
social transformation, including experiments with
public ownership of certain forms of industry—
which in turn will bring about a transformation at
the level of individual consciousness and behavior,
setting the foundations for a “benevolent society”
(jizenteki shakai) (Hirai 1900). Here Hirai comes close
to expressing a socialist perspective, albeit one that
while critical of traditional religion and education
remains couched in the language of morality and
virtue and thus diverges from a strongly “materialist” point of view. Still, the fact that large-scale social
VOLUME 44, NUMBER 2 /JUNE 2015

or economic change is placed in a primary position
is significant, and the emphasis on a transformation
of consciousness as a result of these changes is one
that has precedent in Marx’s earlier writings (though
these would not have been available to Hirai or his
peers). Given Hirai’s early involvement with Olcott
and the Theosophical movement (as well as his late
turn towards “mentalism”), his unreserved criticism
of “spiritualism” in this piece is also significant, and
shows the turn towards the rationalism among most
Unitarians, socialists, as well as the fledgling New
Buddhist movement.
Finally, in a May 1901 essay entitled “Scientific
and Poetical Society” (“Kagakuteki oyobi shikateki
shakai”), Hirai picks up the mid-Meiji discourse of
“practical wisdom” in order to argue that religious
thought and morality must be understood and applied “scientifically” rather than “poetically”; i.e., as
practical means towards social transformation (see
Hirai 1901). Though this may seem on the surface
like standard fare, Hirai moves away from the mainstream by criticizing the emerging militarist rhetoric
(which had been rising since the Japan’s victory in
the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War), as well as what he
perceives as a subsequent decline in freedom of expression and “critique.” Here again, the progress of
the nation is understood as part and parcel of a more
general and comprehensive advance in civilization,
couched in terms explicitly humanist and liberal—
and bordering on the progressive and the radical.
Particularly in his later writings, but even in his
speech to the Parliament, Hirai’s critique of Christianity is much more nuanced than that of most of his
Buddhist reformist peers, since his target is the use
(or abuse) of Christianity—or any religion, including
Buddhism—as a support for oppression and exploitation. Indeed, Hirai’s “synthetic religion” is open to
borrowing ideas from Christianity—Unitarianism,
in particular—as much as Buddhism.3 It was this
more nuanced approach, I contend, that accounts for
Hirai’s “success” at the Parliament—and not simply his proficiency in English (Yoshinaga 2007, 13).
In short, Hirai’s vision of constantly critical Buddhist/religious praxis, ever wary of the danger of
power in its various forms, looks forward to various
streams of theory to arise many decades later in the
West, from feminism to post-colonialism. And once
again, though he could not have been aware of the
connection, Hirai’s critical religious conscience bears
striking similarity to Marx’s early reflections on the
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non-alienated human consciousness once we have
liberated our “species-being.”4 Within Buddhist studies, Hirai’s work seems to predict the work of Critical
Buddhists Matsumoto Shirō and Hakamaya Noriaki,
writing in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Of course, it
must be noted that by the time Hirai penned most of
the above, he had already broken with Buddhism,5
but I would like to emphasize that this was primarily a break with institutional (or “Old”) Buddhism;
despite his Unitarian turn, there is no evidence that
Hirai ever turned his back on Buddhist ideas and basic teachings.

Conclusions
I have discussed in some detail the activities and
ideas of Hirai Kinza, not because his life or work
are necessarily representative of Japanese Buddhist
modernism—which came in manifold forms and flavors—but rather because his case highlights in a particularly interesting way the struggles, tensions, and
creative experimentation that characterize the work
of many East Asian religionists, particularly lay reformers with self-consciously “modernist” inclinations, from the late nineteenth century through the
Asia-Pacific (i.e., Second World) War. Hirai and others of his ilk in Japan, China, and Korea, struggled to
adapt and adjust to the currents of modernity, by accepting the premises of modern “progress” and the
“political” values associated with Western liberalism, while attempting to preserve some elements of
their own traditions—arguing that Western scientific
rationalism and progressive liberalism (or socialism)
were in fact better suited to certain East Asian religious assumptions than those of the Christian West.
In this sense, for all their cultural nationalism, they
might justifiably lay claim to being the first truly
“global” thinkers.
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Notes
1. In what follows, I deliberately avoid discussion
of the last period of Hirai’s life and work; i.e., after his
break with the Unitarians in 1904. While this last decade
of Hirai’s life—including his “return” to occultism and
his role in the formation of the universalist new religious
movement Dōkai (Association of the Way) in 1907—is interesting, it falls beyond the scope of this essay; for more
on Dōkai, see Mullins 1998, 68–71.

2. See Hirai 1893; also Snodgrass 2003, 181–91, for an
extended discussion of Hirai’s speech.
3. Sometimes called “syntheticism” (sōgō shugi) or—
confusingly, given the ethno-particularist understanding of the same term as employed by Inoue Tetsujirō—
“Japanism” (Nihonshugi), Hirai’s universalist vision was
influenced by the shingaku theory of Ishida Baigan (1685–
1744), the mid-Edo moralist and itinerant preacher who
fused Confucian, Daoist, Shinto, and Buddhist ideas. See,
e.g., Hirai 1892; Yoshinaga 2007, 14, 18.
4. Though he did attend at least one session of the newly
established Society for the Study of Socialism (Shakaishugi Kenkyūkai) in 1899, it is not entirely clear how strongly
Hirai was influenced by the work of Marx or similar radical European thinkers. In his youth, his European models
were Spencer (whose politics, like Hegel’s, are ambiguous), and Mill, who is decidedly “liberal” in his political
vision.
5. The “break” came in 1899, after Hirai delivered a
lecture on “synthetic religion” at the Unitarian assembly
hall in Kyoto, for which he was criticized by some Buddhists for “betraying Buddhism” and was forced to leave
the temple in which he was staying in Kyoto. As he later
wrote in an address to the Unitarians in Boston, “From
the moment I desired to make abstract Buddhism practical, they turned their backs” (Hirai 1900, 12).
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In my 2013 Bulletin blog post on the categorization of
religious traditions as Eastern or Western I focused
on my work as an academic studying Tibetan Buddhism in North America and my experiences teaching Eastern religions to students at a post-secondary
institution in the United States.1 Expanding on my
earlier contribution, here I focus my attention on the
challenges and responses related to the East/West
taxonomies in the context of my research and teaching.2
In my own research on Tibetan Buddhist ritual
practices in their diasporic contexts the East/West
issue is ever present. While Tibetan Buddhism has
historically fallen within the so-called East, the
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East/West dichotomy is blurred when considering
post-1950s diasporic Tibetan Buddhist identity and
practice. As noted in my previous blog post, the stereotypes and assumptions associated with Tibet, its
religion and culture, have by and large been rectified by academics in recent years. However, the romanticized and idealized view of Tibet as part of the
mystical East, the font of great wisdom and spiritual
practice, continues to prevail in at least two ways,
and this continues to problematize the categories of
East and West.
The first manner in which Tibet continues to be idealized is at the hands of those living in the diaspora.
As a response to the political situation in Tibet, exiled
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